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Abstract—In 3G wireless technologies, competitive operators
are assigned a fixed part of the spectrum from long-term
auctions. This is known to lead to utilization inefficiencies because
some providers can be congested while others are lightly used.
Moreover it forbids the entrance of new candidate providers.
There is now a stream of work dealing with spectrum sharing
among providers to lead to a better utilization. In this paper,
we study an intermediate model of price competition between
two providers having a fixed (licensed) part of the spectrum, but
where a remaining part (an unlicensed band) can be used in case
of congestion, and is therefore shared. We discuss the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the pricing game when
demand is distributed among providers according to Wardrop’s
principle so that users choose the least expensive perceived price
(when congestion pricing is used), and investigate the influence
of the shared band on social and user welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless technologies are becoming omnipresent, end users
being connected from everywhere, and for a much broader use
than just telephony. The network access can be provided by a
set of technologies, ranging from 3G CDMA-based systems,
WiFi, to WiMAX for instance. Another important issue is
that competition is not only among technologies (which could
be operated by a single provider), but among concurrent
providers which operate on different or similar platforms.
Users indeed have to choose between several service providers,
their choice being based on a combination of price and quality
of service (QoS). Modeling this competition requires the use
of non-cooperative game theory [1], in order to understand
the interactions between (pricing) strategy of each provider,
depending also on the reactions of individual users. This
competitive pricing game has recently been extensively studied
in telecommunications, see among others [2], [3], [4], [5].
In wireless communications especially, resource, that is
spectrum, is limited and congestion is likely to occur. It has
been highlighted that the current spectrum sharing of 3G wire-
less networks, where providers own a long-term licensed fixed
part of the spectrum, does not lead to an efficient utilization,
since some providers can be congested while others are not
fully used [6], [7]. It is now proposed to share at least a part
of the spectrum (unlicensed bands) to cope with that situation
and provide a better average QoS [8]. That kind of principle
somewhat also justifies the development of cognitive networks
where end-to-end performance is dynamically optimized by
providers sensing and opportunistically accessing the under-
utilized spectrum [9], [10].
This paper analyzes a specific pricing game between two
providers having each a fixed and own spectrum, while an
unlicensed part of the spectrum is shared and used when the
fixed one is fully utilized. Spectrum is abstracted as a given
capacity, and providers play on the price per sent packet they
propose to users. We assume demand for service is not delay-
sensitive and depends on the price to correctly send a packet,
where packet losses occur as soon as demand exceeds capacity.
Demand is split among the providers according to Wardrop’s
principle [11], meaning that users have negligible influence
on total traffic, and choose the provider(s) with the smallest
price for sending correctly a packet. Note that our model also
represents the situation where each operator owns a 3G license
and sends traffic on a (shared) WiFi network (transparently
for users) as soon as the QoS using WiFi becomes as good
as using 3G. The questions we aim at answering are: what is
the user equilibrium (if any) for fixed prices? Then is there a
Nash equilibrium in the pricing (non-cooperative) game, that
is a price strategy for each provider such that none of them
can improve his revenue by changing unilaterally his price? If
it exists, is it unique? What is the influence of the proportion
of spectrum left unlicensed on the outcomes of the game?
This work is to our knowledge the first attempt to deal with
a model looking at a two-step game in wireless networks with
(partially) shared spectrum/capacity. In the first step, demand
is split among providers according to price and QoS and on
top of that the pricing game is played among providers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we present the basic model and assumptions.
Section III explains the users’ behavior and their distribution
among the different operators according to a combination of
price and QoS. Using this user equilibrium, we then analyze
the pricing game among providers thanks to non-cooperative
game theory in Section IV. We illustrate how Nash equilibria
can be derived and introduce social welfare (sum of utilities
of all agents) and user welfare (dealing only with users). The
influence of the spectrum proportion kept unlicensed is also
discussed. Finally, we conclude and give some directions for
future research in Section V.
II. MODEL
We consider two providers (operators) in competition, de-
noted by i ∈ {1, 2}. Provider i owns a fixed (licensed) band
of the spectrum. Using this band, he is able to serve a fixed
number of packets Ci per time slot (assuming time is slotted).
On the other hand, we assume that there is a remaining and
unlicensed part of the spectrum, on which a capacity of C
packets per time slot can be served, that the two providers
can use as soon as demand exceeds capacity on their licensed
band. Again, this can also represent the case where providers
operate through a given technology where part of the spectrum
is shared, or could represent the case where providers operate
a licensed technology, say 3G, and may want to send some
traffic transparently to users on another technology (provided
their devices can support it) with shared spectrum, say WiFi,
as soon as their licensed capacity is fully utilized.
Formally, let di be provider i’s demand in a given time
slot (i ∈ {1, 2}). If di ≤ Ci, then all packets are served.
If di > Ci, demand in excess di − Ci is sent to the shared
band. As a consequence, total demand at this shared band is
[d1−C1]
++[d2−C2]
+ where [x]+ = max(0, x). We assume
that packets in excess, when demand exceeds capacity, are
lost and that the lost packets are uniformly chosen among the
sent ones. Similarly, we assume that, at each provider, the
packets sent on the shared band are uniformly chosen. As a
consequence, the part of shared capacity devoted to provider
i for i ∈ {1, 2} is
C ′i =
[di − Ci]
+
[d1 − C1]+ + [d2 − C2]+
C, (1)
with the convention 0/0 = 0, and a packet is correctly sent
(that is, not lost) at provider i with probability
qi = min
„
1,
Ci + C
′
i
di
«
= min
0
@1, Ci +
[di−Ci]
+
[d1−C1]++[d2−C2]+
C
di
1
A .
(2)
Indeed, given the uniform choice, the probability of successful
transmission is the ratio of correctly transmitted packets on
submitted ones if demand exceeds capacity, and 1 if capacity
is above demand. Figure 1 summarizes the way providers
distribute demand.
d2
d1
C2
C =
{
C ′1 =
[d1−C1]
+
[d1−C1]++[d2−C2]+
C
C ′2 =
[d2−C2]
+
[d1−C1]++[d2−C2]+
C
C1
Fig. 1. Summary of used capacities
Similarly to [5], we assume that users are charged per
submitted packet and not per correctly transmitted ones. That
way, in periods of congestion charges for a given successful
transmission are higher to incentivize users to restrict their
traffic. It is therefore a kind of congestion pricing.
Denote by pi the price that provider i fixes for each packet
sent to his network. Given that each packet is successfully
transmitted with probability qi, the average number of attempts
before success is 1/qi, the average value of a geometric
distribution with parameter qi, demand being considered the
same in each time slot (this is not a limitation if time slots are
very short with respect to demand fluctations in time). Thus a
perceived price per correctly transmitted packet at provider i,
i.e., the total average price to pay for sending a packet is
p¯i = pi
1
qi
= pi max

1, di
Ci +
[di−Ci]+
[d1−C1]++[d2−C2]+
C

 . (3)
Remark that it is not required to announce a price per sent
packet (users are not likely to approve paying for rejected
packets), but rather announce a congestion price p¯i for suc-
cessful transmission.
Our goal is now to investigate in next section how users will
split themselves among the different providers at equilibrium,
and what the total demand will be. Section IV deals with
the price war among providers using the determined user
equilibrium.
III. USER EQUILIBRIUM
Users are assumed to be infinitesimal, which means that
their individual influence on the total traffic is negligible. Their
behavior is to follow the so-called Wardrop’s principle [11]
taken from road transportation: demand is distributed in such
a way that all users choose the available provider(s) with the
lowest perceived price, and none if this perceived price is too
expensive. Therefore all users perceive the same price
p¯ := min(p¯1, p¯2). (4)
Total demand, defined as the total number of packets for
which the willingness to pay is larger than or equal to p¯, is a
function D(·) of the perceived price p¯, and is assumed to be
continuous and strictly decreasing.
We therefore end up with the following set of equations
characterizing the Wardrop (user) equilibrium:
p¯1 = p1max

1, d1
C1 +
[d1−C1]+
[d1−C1]++[d2−C2]+
C

(5)
p¯2 = p2max

1, d2
C2 +
[d2−C2]+
[d1−C1]++[d2−C2]+
C

(6)
d1 + d2 = D(min(p¯1, p¯2)) (7)
p¯1 > p¯2 ⇒ d1 = 0 (8)
p¯2 > p¯1 ⇒ d2 = 0. (9)
Equations (5) and (6) express the perceived prices in terms
of demand. Equations (8) and (9) express the fact that only
cheapest providers get demand, otherwise some users would
be better off switching. Equation (7) just relates total demand
to perceived price (which is then the same for both providers
if they both have a positive demand).
We then have the following theorem.
Proposition 1: Whatever the price profile (p1, p2), there
exists at least one Wardrop equilibrium. The corresponding
perceived prices are unique.
Proof: The existence of a Wardop equilibrium is proved
in a very general context in [12].
To show the uniqueness of the perceived price, assume that
we have two Wardrop equilibria with demand (d1, d2) and
(d′1, d
′
2) leading to respective perceived prices (p¯1, p¯2) and
(p¯′1, p¯
′
2). Assume (p¯1, p¯2) 6= (p¯
′
1, p¯
′
2) and let p¯ = min(p¯1, p¯2),
p¯′ = min(p¯′1, p¯
′
2). Without loss of generality we can suppose
that p¯1 < p¯
′
1, which implies several things:
d′1 > C1 +
[d′1 − C1]
+
[d′1 − C1]
+ + [d′2 − C2]
+
C (10)
C < [d′1 − C1]
+ + [d′2 − C2]
+ (11)
p¯′ = p¯′1. (12)
Relation (10) is a direct consequence of (5) and p¯′1 > p¯1 ≥ p1.
Moreover, p¯′1 > p1 means some packets are lost at provider
1 under the situation (d′1, d
′
2). Due to our capacity allocation
rule, packets can be lost only under (11).
Relation (12) comes from (10) and the fact that (d′1, d
′
2)
is a Wardrop equilibrium, so only the cheapest (in terms of
perceived costs) provider(s) have positive demand.
Relation (4) then implies that p¯ = min(p¯1, p¯2) ≤ p¯1 <
p¯′1 = p¯
′, therefore from (7) and the non-increasingness of the
demand function, we have
d = d1 + d2 > d
′ = d′1 + d
′
2. (13)
Our goal is now to show that there is a contradiction: if total
demand increases, then the perceived price increases too. We
consider two cases, depending on the sign of d1 − d
′
1.
• If d1 > d
′
1, then we have [d1 − C1]
+ + [d2 − C2]
+ ≥
[d′1 − C1]
+ + [d′2 − C2]
+: it is indeed obvious if d2 ≥ d
′
2,
whereas if d2 < d
′
2 we have
[d′2 − C2]
+ − [d2 − C2]
+ ≤ d′2 − d2
< d1 − d
′
1
= [d1 − C1]
+ − [d′1 − C1]
+,
where the second inequality comes from (13), and the last
equality stems from (10) and d1 > d
′
1.
Consequently we have1, using also again d1 > d
′
1 > C1,
d1
C1 +
[d1−C1]+
[d1−C1]++[d2−C2]+
C
≥
d1
C1 +
[d1−C1]+
[d′
1
−C1]++[d′2−C2]
+C
=
d1
Ad1 +B
,
where A = 1[d′
1
−C1]++[d′2−C2]
+C > 0, and B =
C1
(
1− 1[d′
1
−C1]++[d′2−C2]
+
)
> 0 from (11). Therefore x 7→
1Notice that [d′1 − C1]
+ + [d′2 − C2]
+ > 0 from (10), therefore the
denominators are non-zero.
x/(Ax+B) is increasing in x, and thus
d1
C1 +
[d1−C1]+
[d1−C1]++[d2−C2]+
C
≥
d′1
C1 +
[d′
1
−C1]+
[d′
1
−C1]++[d′2−C2]
+C
,
meaning p¯1 ≥ p¯
′
1 from (5), which is a contradiction.
• Now consider the case d1 ≤ d
′
1. Then d2 > d
′
2 from (13),
and
• if [d′2 − C2]
+ = 0 then, from (6), p¯′2 = p2 ≤ p¯2;
• if [d′2 − C2]
+ > 0 then using the same reasoning as in
the case d1 > d
′
1, just inverting the roles of the providers,
we get that p¯′2 ≤ p¯2.
Since d2 > d
′
2, then d2 > 0, and the Wardrop condition
implies that p¯ = p¯2 ≤ p¯1. On the other hand, p¯
′ ≤ p¯′2.
Therefore, applying (12) and the fact that p¯′2 ≤ p¯2 we have
p¯′1 ≤ p¯1, a contradiction.
Remark 1: From the uniqueness of the perceived price
p¯, the uniqueness of demand distribution (d1, d2) can be
discussed. First d1 + d2 = D(p¯) is unique from (7). Next if
both providers are strictly saturated (i.e., p¯i > pi for i = 1, 2),
then the maximum is given by the right side in the max of
(5) and (6), and (d1, d2) is the unique solution of
p¯ = pi
di
Ci +
di−Ci
D(p¯)−C1−C2
C
, i = 1, 2.
Similarly, if only one provider is strictly saturated, say i ∈
{1, 2}, we have di solution of p¯ = pi
di
Ci+C
, and demand at
provider j 6= i is dj = D(p¯)− di. Now the last case is when
no provider is saturated and experiences losses. When p1 < p2
(without loss of generality), it means that 1 absorbs the whole
demand D(p1) while 2 gets nothing. If p1 = p2 = p, we
are in the only situation of non-uniqueness: users do not care
choosing between the providers since they have the same price
and none is congested, even if the unlicensed band is used by
one of the provider. More formally, each point (d1 = x, d2 =
D(p)− x) is a Wardop equilibrium, for max(0, D(p)−C2 −
C) ≤ x ≤ min(D(p), C1 + C). In the numerical analyses of
the next sections, for those rare cases we choose to spread
demand among providers, proportionally to their capacities,
i.e. we fix di = D(p)
Ci
C1+C2
.
Figure 2 illustrates the Wardrop equilibrium characteriza-
tion, for fixed values of the unit prices p1 = 1, p2 = 2
and a given demand function. The increasing curve gives
the total demand level that would correspond to a given
perceived price: if total demand D is below C1, then all users
choose provider 1 and perceive the price p¯ = p1. Likewise, if
C1 < D ≤ C1 + C, then the needed extra capacity D − C1
is available to provider 1 and the perceived price is still
p¯ = p1. When D exceeds C1 + C, then provider 2 does not
necessarily get some demand, since users may be better off
choosing provider 1 even in case of losses. More precisely,
if C1 + C < D < (C1 + C)p2/p1, then all users stay with
provider 1 since the perceived price is then p¯ = p1
D
C1+C
< p2.
This situation is depicted in Figure 2 as case a. Provider
2 actually gets some demand when total demand exceeds
(C1+C)p2/p1: if (C1+C)p2/p1 < D ≤ (C1+C)p2/p1+C2
C1
C
C2
case a
case b
case c
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Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the Wardrop equilibrium demand and
perceived price for three different demand functions.
then the perceived price is p2 and provider 2 gets demand
d2 = D − (C1 + C)p2/p1. This corresponds to case b in
Figure 2. When D > (C1+C)p2/p1 (this is case c in Figure 2,
both providers become saturated, and the unlicensed band
is shared among them according to (1). We therefore have
p¯1 = p¯2 = p¯, and (d1, d2) can be found by solving the system
(5)− (6). The perceived price at the Wardrop equilibrium is
determined by the intersection of
• the increasing demand-perceived price relation due to
congestion and the capacity allocation rule,
• and the decreasing demand-perceived price relation (7),
corresponding to user willingness-to-pay for the service.
IV. PRICING GAME BETWEEN PROVIDERS
We now consider the competition game among providers.
We assume providers know that for given prices p1 and
p2, users will behave according to the Wardrop equilibrium
described in the previous section. Providers therefore use
that knowledge to determine their best pricing strategy. This
makes the situation under study a two-stage game, where at a
first stage providers set prices, and at the second stage users
make their decision, determining the repartition (d1, d2) (see
Remark 1 for the rare cases when demands are not unique).
In this section, we focus on the upper-level game on prices,
where the provider revenues are those obtained at Wardrop
equilibrium.
We will illustrate the concepts introduced using some nu-
merical results. Unless otherwise specified, the model param-
eters that we take are C1 = 1.2, C2 = 2.4, C = 0.4, and
D(p) = [10 − 3p]+. We will refer to that set of example
values as S.
A. Provider utility and pricing game
The payoff we consider for provider i is simply his revenue
Ri(p1, p2) := pidi for i ∈ {1, 2}. (14)
As pointed out in the previous section, the demand of provider
i at the Wardrop equilibrium outcome depends not only on
his price pi, but also on the price of his opponent. The natural
modeling framework is therefore that of non-cooperative game
theory, and the equilibrium that of a Nash equilibrium [1].
A Nash equilibrium is a point of price strategies (p∗1, p
∗
2)
such that no provider can increase his revenue by unilaterally
changing his price, i.e., ∀p1, p2 ≥ 0,
R1(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) ≥ R1(p1, p
∗
2) and R2(p
∗
1, p
∗
2) ≥ R2(p
∗
1, p2).
The questions we wish to answer are then: is there a Nash
equilibrium to this game? If so, is it unique?
Determining existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilib-
rium is difficult with this model, due to the non-derivability
of the revenue functions and the multiple ratios involved. We
therefore see how to analyze it numerically and investigate
the influence of the unlicensed spectrum. Consider again
the parameter set S. First, Figure 3 displays the revenue of
provider 1 in terms of his price p1 for different values of
p2, the other fixed values being those in S. It illustrates that
p2 = 1
p2 = 2
p2 = 3
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Fig. 3. Total utility of provider 1 as a function of p1.
provider 1 revenue is first increasing and then decreasing.
The three curves in Figure 3 are the same for low values
of p1: indeed, when p1 is low enough then all users choose
provider 1. More precisely, if D(p2) < (C1 + C)p2/p1, then
the Wardrop intersection point (p¯, D), illustrated as case a in
Figure 2, is for p¯ < p2, implying d2 = 0 from (9). On the
contrary, when p1 > p2
C1+C
D(p2)
, the curves in Figure 3 exhibit
different behaviors:
• when p2 = 1, the utility of provider 1 is maximal when
p1 is around 0.73. This corresponds to a situation where
both providers are saturated at the Wardrop equilibrium
(case c in Figure 2).
• When p2 = 2, provider 2 is indifferent between all values
in the range [0.75− 1.5]. For those values of p1, we are
in the case b of Figure 2: the user perceived price is
p2, provider 1 gets demand d2 = p2/p1(C1 + C) while
d2 = D(p2)− p2/p1(C1 +C). Then in this whole range
for p1, the revenue of provider 1 is R1 = p2(C1+C). For
that case, there is not a unique best strategy for player 1
as a response to p2, but a whole interval.
• When p2 = 3, then the revenue of provider 1 is maximal
for p1 = 2.83, i.e. in the zone where d2 = 0 (case
a of Figure 2). If provider 1 increases his price, then
the revenue loss due to the decrease of d1 (because of
total demand decrease or because some users switch to
provider 2) exceeds the gain due to price increase.
Consider now the best reply of each provider i ∈ {1, 2} as
a function of BRi : R
+ 7→ P(R+), such that
BR1(p2) := argmax
p1≥0
R1(p1, p2) and
BR2(p1) := argmax
p2≥0
R2(p1, p2).
In words, the best replies are the price values (not necessarily
unique) maximizing the revenue of a provider, when the price
of the opponent is fixed. Nash equilibria are therefore the set
of points (p∗1, p
∗
2) for which p
∗
1 ∈ BR1(p
∗
2) and p
∗
2 ∈ BR2(p
∗
1),
i.e., a fixed point of the best reply correspondance defined as
BR(p1, p2) := {(q1, q2) ∈ R
+ × R+ : q1 ∈ BR1(p2), q2 ∈
BR2(p1)}.
Figure 4 gives an example of those best replies for param-
eter values in S. First, we remark that best-replies are not
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Fig. 4. Best reply curves of both providers, C/Ctotal = 0.1.
always unique; non-uniqueness actually correspond here to
the situation of Figure 3 for p2 = 2, where the concurrent
provider is not saturated, so that revenue does not change over
an interval. The best-reply correspondences seem to meet in
three different zones: first at (0, 0), then they cross at a point
p∗ ≈ (1.05, 1.45), and on the whole range 2 < p1 = p2 < 2.4.
Actually, for that latter zone, best-reply curves do not cross:
the zone corresponds to the case max(C1, C2) < D(p) <
C1 + C2 + C, and therefore if providers have the same price
p, each provider i would have an incentive to decrease one’s
price pi by a small ε > 0, so as to fall into case b of Figure 2,
and obtain demand Ci +C. Therefore, there is no equilibrium
in that zone.
While (0, 0) is a trivial Nash equilibrium, we can also
notice that it is not stable: if one provider slightly deviates
and sets a small positive price, then successive best replies of
the providers lead to the second Nash equilibrium p∗ that we
pointed out, and that is stable.
Interestingly, the provider i with the largest own capacity
Ci (here i = 2) sets a higher price, possibly because he is
less in need for unlicensed band, and therefore is less affected
by price competition. Notice also that the unique stable
Nash equilibrium (p∗1, p
∗
2) corresponds to a case when both
providers are saturated. Therefore the whole band (licensed
+ unlicensed) is used. Total demand even exceeds the overall
transmission capacity C1 + C2 + C, and therefore there are
some losses. We have seen how to compute a Nash equilibrium
and interpret the pricing game; we now propose a measure of
social welfare that takes those losses into account.
B. Social and user welfare considerations
We suggest to define social welfare as the overall “value”
of the system, i.e. the sum of the utilities of all participants
(including users and providers). Prices paid by users are
received by providers, thus those monetary exchanges do not
appear in our social welfare measure, and social welfare should
reflect the sum of the willingness-to-pay values of all users
that are served. We considered infinitesimal users, therefore
such a value is calculated as an integral: if we define v as the
inverse function of the demand, then
∫ x
0
v is the overall user
value if the x users with highest willingness-to-pay are served.
When x users with highest willingness-to-pay are likely to be
served but losses can occur with equal probability Ploss for
those users, the corresponding sum of willingness-to-pay for
served users is then
SW = (1− Ploss)
∫ x
0
v. (15)
Since v is decreasing and 1−Ploss ≤
C1+C2+C
x
with equality
for some repartitions of x over the providers, the optimal value
of social welfare is SWmax =
∫ C1+C2+C
0
v. For our case, at
a Nash equilibrium the D(p¯) users with highest willingness-
to-pay send their data, and Ploss =
[
1− C1+C2+C
D(p¯)
]+
for all
of those users. We therefore have:
Proposition 2: The Social Welfare at Nash equilibrium is
SW = min
(
1,
C1 + C2 + C
D(p¯)
)∫ D(p¯)
0
v, (16)
compared with the optimal one SWmax =
∫ C1+C2+C
0
v.
Also, the overall User Welfare (user willingness-to-pay
minus price paid) is UW = SW−R1 −R2.
C. Licensed vs unlicensed capacity
Let us now investigate the influence of the fraction µ of total
available band that is unlicensed on the system outcomes. We
assume that there is a total band Ctotal, that can be licensed
to a provider or declared as unlicensed. We choose to fix the
ratio r = C1/C2, so that
C = µCtotal, C1 =
r(1− µ)
1 + r
Ctotal, C2 =
1− µ
1 + r
Ctotal.
In what follows, we consider as before Ctotal = 4 and r =
0.5. Figure 5 shows the stable Nash prices (p∗1, p
∗
2) and the
corresponding user perceived price p¯ when µ varies, whereas
Figure 6 plots the provider revenues, user welfare UW, and
overall social welfare SW versus µ. When the proportion
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Fig. 5. Prices at Nash equilibrium when µ varies.
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of unlicensed band increases, the revenue of both providers
decreases since they have to drastically lower their price in
order to stay competitive (see Figure 5). This benefits to users,
who perceive a lower price p¯ and experience a larger user
welfare. However, the overall social welfare decreases, which
means that resources are less efficiently used. Using that kind
of study, a central authority (a government for instance) could
fix a given amount of shared spectrum so as to favor user
welfare over provider revenue. However, setting µ too large
leads prices and provider revenues tend to 0, thus a trade-off
has to be found to still ensure provider rentability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated the price war among wireless
providers when part of the spectrum is unlicensed and can be
freely used. We have shown the existence of a user equilibrium
and described how to determine a Nash equilibrium for
the price war. We have also shown how the choice of the
unlicensed spectrum weight affects the trade-off between user
welfare and overall social welfare.
Next steps of this work are numerous. A relevant aspect is
to see what happens if the unlicensed spectrum is charged to
providers: could it help to improve the general behavior of
the system? Similarly, we would like to investigate the best
proportion of unlicensed band if there is a different weight for
user and provider utilities in a global objective measure for a
regulating authority.
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